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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that in some jurisdictions the respondent may be required to post a
bond or that he may be put on probation. 23  Furthermore, the civil
nature of the proceeding precludes objection on the ground that the
law is ex post facto in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the
Constitution. 24 The question of whether the law impairs the obliga-
tion of contracts was decided in Smith v. Smith .2  The action was
commenced by a divorced wife against her ex-husband for support of
their minor children. In granting an order of support, the court held
that a divorce decree is not that type of contract contemplated by the
Federal Constitution. In addition to the above objections, the com-
pact clause of the Federal Constitution has been offered as an argu-
ment against constitutionality. It must be observed, however, that
the reciprocal law bears no aspect of a compact between the states
since each state is free to repeal or amend the law at any time.2 6
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals passed upon the consti-
tutionality of the New York law for the first time; and, in disposing
of the respondent's arguments, the Court adopted the same reasoning
heretofore used in other jurisdictions. That such legislation is not
prohibited by specific constitutional provisions has been pointed out
by decisions in the various cases upholding its validity. The factual
pattern of the present case illustrates the value of reciprocal support
laws, but in a larger sense it demonstrates the propriety of reciprocal
legislation which erases artificial barriers erected by state lines.
Similar legislation in other fields will promote the ends of justice by
eliminating the jurisdictional difficulties raised by a federal form of
government.
ToRTs - LIBEL AND SLANDER - ORAL EXTEMPORANEOUS RE-
MARKS OVER TELEVISION HELD LIBELOUS. - Plaintiff brought an
action for libel alleging extemporaneous defamatory statements over
defendant-television broadcasting station by defendant-master of cere-
monies as to his being deeply in debt. Defendants made a motion to
dismiss contending that a complaint which alleges false oral remarks
does not state a cause of action in libel. The Court in denying the
La. 410, 76 So. 2d 414 (1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Warren v. Warren, 204
Md. 467, 105 A.2d 488 (1954).
23 See Freeman v. Freeman, supra note 22. See also N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT
OF DEPENDENTS LAW § 2116(k).
24 Smith v. Smith, 131 Cal. App. 2d 764, 281 P.2d 274 (1955).
-25 131 Cal. App. 2d 764, 281 P.2d 274 (1955).
26 See Duncan v. Smith, supra note 22. See also Brockelbank, Is the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act Constitutional?, 31 Opt. L. REv.
7. 98 (1952).
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motion held that an allegation of extemporaneous oral defamatory re-
marks over television is sufficient to constitute a cause of action in
libel. Shor v. Billingsley, - Misc. 2d -, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
Traditionally defamation has been separated into two categories
according to the form of dissemination chosen, slander being oral and
libel being written.' For oral defamation, with certain exceptions, 2
special damages have to be established; 3 while for a writing, by nature
more permanent and durable, damage is presumed. 4 Libel has been
further extended to include all communications by sight, e.g., a
picture,5 caricature, 6 or effigy.7
However, courts and the state legislattires seem to be either in
hopeless disagreement or indecision 8 as to which form to apply to new
technological developments. Defamation by. motion pictures has been
consistently classified as libel,9 but no such uniformity exists where
false remarks were broadcast over radio or television. Some courts,
applying the classic distinctions of form, categorized defamatory state-
ments read from a script as libel,' 0 and extemporaneous remarks as
slander." In another group of cases the form used was not decisive
since recovery, in any case, could be granted without proof of special
damages. Thus, where the remarks were actionable per se, either
' See Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Nichols
v. Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860 (1956); Locke v.
Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct 1937), aff'd nem., 253
App. Div. 887, 13 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938).
2 Proof of actual damages of a pecuniary nature need not be alleged if the
false utterance imputes to the party commission of a crime involving moral
turpitude, unfitness in profession, trade or duties of employment, or a loathsome
disease, [see Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875) ; Keefe v. O'Brien, 203 Misc.
113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Bennett v. Seimiller, 175 Kan. 764,
267 P.2d 926 (1954)] or unchastity to a woman. N.Y. RuLES Civ. PRAC. 97.
3 Locke v. Gibbons, supra note 1. See Moore v. Francis, 123 N.Y. 199,
23 N.E. 1127 (1890).
4 Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505; see Pollard v. Lyon, supra
note 2; Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q.B. 524 (C.A.).
5 Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) ; Burton v. Crowell Publishing
Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
6 Brown v. Harrington, 208 Mass. 600, 95 N.E. 655 (1911).
7Johnson v. Commonwealth, 14 Atl. 425 (Pa. 1888) (per curiam).
8 Schultz v. Frankfort. Marine, Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 152 Wis.
537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913).
9 See Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D.C. Mass.
1944); Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y. Supp.
544 (3d Dep't 1934); Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App.
Div. 376, 152 N.Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dep't 1915) ; Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934).
10 See Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116
A.2d 440 (1955); Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932);
Weglein v. Golder, 317 Pa. 437, 177 Atl. 47 (1935).
1 Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). It is note-
worthy that this case involved a communication by sight over a television
broadcast.
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reflecting upon the integrity of a public official, 12 imputing the com-
mission of a crime,' 3 or injuring the plaintiff in his business,' 4 the
courts refused to classify the defamation. One Pennsylvania court
would not distinguish between libel and slander with relation to the
modern electronic media since the wide range of dissemination pos-
sible is equally present whether the utterance is oral or written. 5
Various state statutes 16 are in disagreement as to whether defamatiQn
over the air waves constitutes libel or slander; while in England, by
statute, any defamatory broadcast is considered libel.' 7
Some jurisdictions have generally limited the liability of a broad-
casting station as a disseminator of defamation, demanding only a high
standard of preventative care. If the remarks were extemporaneous,' 8
or there was no right of censorship over a defamatory political
speech, 19 the station was relieved of responsibility. Liability could be
imposed, however, when there was some method of control not
utilized, as a failure to censor a defamatory script.20 Conversely, in
other states the element of control is not relevant in deciding the ques-
tion of liability. Thus, in Sorensen v. Wood,21 the fact that a broad-
caster was precluded by act of Congress 22 from censoring a political
speech, was held not to constitute a defense. The court declared
liability to be comparable to that of a newspaper,23 observing that a
radio station had no "privilege to join and assist a libel." 21 Since
then, twenty-six states 25 have adopted statutes absolving the station
12 See Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948).
13 See Irwin v. Ashhurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938).
14 Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
15 See Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d
302 (1939). See also Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889
(W.D. Mo. 1934).
16 See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 46 (West 1954) (slander); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 770.03 (1944) (libel or slander); ILL. Ray. STAT. c. 38, § 404.1 (libel) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 2-518 (Burns 1946) (libel or slander) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 64-205 (1947) (libel or slander) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2815 (1943) (slander)
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.58.010 (Supp. 1955) (criminal libel).
17 Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 GEo. 6 & 1 ELiZ. 2, c. 66.
18 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., supra note 15.
9 Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948).2 0 Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
21 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed, KFAB Broadcasting
Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (per curiam); cf. Coffey v. Midland
Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934) ; Miles v. Louis Wasmer.
Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
2266 STAT. 717, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1952).
23 See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Walker v. Bee-News
Publishing Co., 122 Neb. 511, 240 N.W. 579 (1932); Laudati v. Stea, 44 R.I.
303, 117 Atl. 422 (1922).\
24 Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 85 (1932), appeal dismissed,
KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (per curiam).
25 ARIz. CODE ANN. § 27-2007 (Supp. 1954); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1606
(1956): CAL. CIV. CODE §48.5(3) (West 1954); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
c. 41-2-6 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §770.04 (Supp. 1956); GA. CODE ANN.
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from liability for defamatory remarks made by a political candidate,
while several states 26 make it contingent upon the exercise of due care.
New York has followed the formal distinctions between libel and
slander in both radio and television so that only statements delivered
from a script are libelous. 27 Some lack of "due care" 28 or disregard
of control, such as re-broadcasting the defamation,29 seems to be suffi-
cient to extend liability to the broadcaster. Station owners have not
been held responsible for interpolated defamatory comments,30 a mere
coincidental allusion to the plaintiff by television scenery 31 or, by
statute, for a defamatory political broadcast.32
The instant case, declaring the "permanence of form" concept "
not to be a restrictive doctrine, is the first to extend the principle of
libel to oral remarks. The Court contended that any broadcast, re-
gardless of form, has a greater potential for harm than a writing, and
therefore is more properly placed in the libel area. It was further
stated that legislation is not needed to change the rule since defama-
tion is basically a common-law action. No mention is made of the
§ 105-713 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-701 (Supp. 1955); ILL. REV. STAT.
c. 38, §404.2(b) (1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-746a (Supp. 1955);
LA. REV. STAT. tit. 45, § 1352 (1954) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 130, § 32 (1954) ;
MIcH. STAT. ANN. §27.1406 (Supp. 1953); Miss. CODE ANN. §1059.5(2)(1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.105 (Vernon 1953); NEB. REv. STAT. §86-602
(1950) ; NEV. STAT. c. 230 (1951) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-35 (Supp. 1955) ;
N.D. REv. CODE § 14-0209 (Supp. 1953); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.03 (A)
(Baldwin Supp. 1956); ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.760(2) (1953); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1585 (Purdon Supp. 1956); S.C. CoDE § 23-7 (Supp. 1956); UTAH
CODE ANN. §45-2-5 (Supp. 1955); VA. CODE ANN. §8-632.1 (1950); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 5482(1) (Michie 1955) ; Wyo. COmp. STAT. ANN. § 3-8204 (Supp.
1955).26 IOVA CODE ANN. § 659.5 (1950) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99-5 (Michie
1950) ; S.D. CODE § 47.0506 (Supp. 1952) ; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5433a
(Vernon Supp. 1956) ; cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 19A (Flack 1951) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 544.043 (Supp. 1954) ; MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 64-205 (1947);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.64.010 (1943).
27 Hartmann v. Winchefl, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) ; Hryhorijiv v.
Winchell, 180 Misc. 574, 45 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd tin., 267 App.
Div. 817, 47 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1st Dep't 1944). In like manner extemporaneous
remarks are treated as slander. See Tex Smith, The Harmonica Man, Inc. v.
Godfrey, 198 Misc. 1006, 102 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Locke v. Gibbons,
164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd mine., 253 App. Div.
887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (Ist Dep't 1938). One case would seem to place a defama-
tory television prop in the libel area. Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mner., 1 A.D.2d 660,
147 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1st Dep't 1955). See also Leflar, Torts, 1954 ANN. SURVEY
AM. L. 549, 562.
28 See Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38
N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
29 See Tex Smith, The Harmonica Man, Inc. v. Godfrey, supra note 27.
30 See Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., supra note 28.
31 See Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra note 27.
32 N.Y. Civ. PaAc. AcT § 337-a. See Legis. Note, Defamation By Radio And
Television, 30 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 133 (1955).
33 See Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 39, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931).
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extent of liability of the defendant-broadcaster for a seemingly
uncontrollable remark, save that a good cause of action is stated
against it.
In examining the case in relation to the judicial development of
the law, it would seem to sanction a contradiction in terms. No longer
need a libel be "considered as written, and a slander as spoken,
defamation." 4 This is in direct violation of the dictum laid down in
Locke v. Gibbons,3 5 and followed by all jurisdictions save two,3 6 that
"our courts cannot legislate to eradicate the long-established distinc-
tions between libel and slander." 3
lVhile it is true that damage from defamatory statements can
almost be presumed to occur over the modern electronic media, it
would seem more logical to include oral defamation by radio or tele-
vision as a category of slander per se.38 Another solution might be
to discard the "outmoded" forms and make one action for defamation
with certain categories exempt from proof of special damages. The
Legislature and not the courts would seem the best method of cor-
recting a field of our law rapidly becoming confused and divided by
contradiction.
A
ZONING - ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - DENIAL OF BUILDING
APPROVAL TO CHURCH I 1ELD ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE. -
The petitioner brought a proceeding under Article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Act to review a decision of the Planning Board
of the town of Brighton. The town zoning ordinance required the
approval of the Board for the erection of a church with accessory
uses in a restricted class "A" zoning district. The petitioner applied
for approval; the Board denied it and was affirmed in the courts
below. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Board's decision
arbitrary and unreasonable. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board,
1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
Present day zoning, which is of comparatively recent origin 1
resulted from the recognition that some regulation of private property
34 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 880, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188, 193 (Sup. Ct.
1937), aff'd mere., 253 App. Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938).
35 Ibid.
36 See Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d
302 (1939) ; see also Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.
Mo. 1934).
37 Locke v. Gibbons, supra note 34.
38 See note 2 supra. It is interesting to note that falsely imputing unchastity
to a woman was made actionable per se by statute. This was formerly adopted
in Section 1908 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure and is continued
today in the New York Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 97.
' Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty !Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
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